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Abstract
This position paper argues that the Baldwin effect
is widely misunderstood by the evolutionary
computation community. The misunderstandings
appear to fall into two general categories. Firstly,
it is commonly believed that the Baldwin effect is
concerned with the synergy that results when
there is an evolving population of learning indi-
viduals. This is only half of the story. The full
story is more complicated and more interesting.
The Baldwin effect is concerned with the costs
and benefits of lifetime learning by individuals in
an evolving population. Several researchers have
focussed exclusively on the benefits, but there is
much to be gained from attention to the costs.
This paper explains the two sides of the story and
enumerates ten of the costs and benefits of life-
time learning by individuals in an evolving popu-
lation. Secondly, there is a cluster of
misunderstandings about the relationship
between the Baldwin effect and Lamarckian
inheritance of acquired characteristics. The Bald-
win effect is not Lamarckian. A Lamarckian
algorithm is not better for most evolutionary
computing problems than a Baldwinian algo-
rithm. Finally, Lamarckian inheritance is not a
better model of memetic (cultural) evolution than
the Baldwin effect.
1 Introduction
Since Hinton and Nowlan’s (1987) classic paper, several
researchers have observed a synergetic effect in evolution-
ary computation when there is an evolving population of
learning individuals (Ackley and Littman, 1991; Belew,
1989; Belew et al., 1991; French and Messinger, 1994;
Hart, 1994; Hart and Belew, 1996; Hightower et al., 1996;
Whitley and Gruau, 1993; Whitley et al., 1994). This syn-
ergetic effect is usually called the Baldwin effect. This has
produced the misleading impression that there is nothing
more to the Baldwin effect than synergy. A myth or legend
has arisen that the Baldwin effect is simply a special
instance of synergy. One of the goals of this paper is to
dispel this myth.
Roughly speaking (we will be more precise later), the
Baldwin effect has two aspects. First, lifetime learning in
individuals can, in some situations, accelerate evolution.
Second, learning is expensive. Therefore, in relatively sta-
ble environments, there is a selective pressure for the evo-
lution of instinctive behaviors. Recent research in
evolutionary computation has focussed almost exclusively
on the first aspect of the Baldwin effect. This paper is an
attempt to encourage a more balanced view. Learning has
benefits (the first aspect of the Baldwin effect) but it also
has costs (the second aspect). The Baldwin effect is con-
cerned with the costs and benefits of lifetime learning in
an evolving population.
The second goal of this paper is to clarify the relationship
between the Baldwin effect and Lamarckian inheritance of
acquired characteristics. The Baldwin effect resembles
Lamarckism in some ways: behaviors that are learned in
one generation become instinctive in a later generation.
However, the Baldwin effect is purely Darwinian. Unlike
Lamarckism, acquired characteristics (behaviors that an
individual acquires by lifetime learning) are not directly
inherited. What is inherited is the ability to acquire the
characteristics (the ability to learn).
We begin in Section 2 with a brief discussion of terminol-
ogy. Section 3 attempts to accurately describe the Baldwin
effect. We then discuss the costs and benefits of lifetime
learning in an evolving population in Section 4. The rela-
tionship between Lamarckism and the Baldwin effect is
examined in Section 5. We conclude in Section 6.
2 Terminology
Before we continue, we should define a few terms. The
genotype is the genetic constitution of an individual. In a
living organism, this is typically the organism’s DNA. In
evolutionary computation, it is typically a string of bits.
The phenotype is the set of observable characteristics of an
organism, as determined by the organism’s genotype and
environment. Roughly speaking, the genotype is the DNA
and the phenotype is the body. The distinction between
genotype and phenotype is clear in biological evolution,
but the distinction does not exist in many of the simpler
examples of evolutionary computation.
Lifetime learning is learning during the lifetime of an indi-
vidual. The evolution of a species may also be viewed as a
form of learning, but it is learning at the level of popula-
tions, while lifetime learning is learning at the level of the
individual. Phenotypic plasticity is the ability of an organ-
ism to adapt to its environment. The most obvious form of
phenotypic plasticity is lifetime learning. However, there
are many other forms of phenotypic plasticity, such as our
ability to tan in sunny environments or our ability to form
a callus when our skin is repeatedly abraded. In its most
general sense, the Baldwin effect deals with the impact of
phenotypic plasticity on evolution. The impact of lifetime
learning on evolution is only one example of the Baldwin
effect.
3 The Baldwin Effect
The “Baldwin effect” is a misnomer, because the Baldwin
effect was discovered independently by Baldwin (1896),
Morgan (1896), and Osborn (1896), and also because it is
not a single effect. It is rather a cluster of effects, or per-
haps a cluster of observations.
1. Benefits of phenotypic plasticity: Briefly, phenotypic
plasticity smooths the fitness landscape, which can facili-
tate evolution. In more detail, phenotypic plasticity
enables the organism to explore neighboring regions of
phenotype space. The fitness of an organism is then deter-
mined (approximately) by the maximum fitness in its local
region of phenotype space. If the genotype and the pheno-
type are correlated, so that a small change in one usually
corresponds to a small change in the other, then the fitness
of the genotype of a plastic individual is given (approxi-
mately) by the maximum fitness in the local region in gen-
otype space. Therefore, plasticity has the effect of
smoothing the fitness landscape. This makes it easier for
evolution to climb to peaks in the landscape.
2. Benefits of phenotypic rigidity: Phenotypic rigidity
can be advantageous in many situations. Therefore organ-
isms may slowly evolve rigid mechanisms that replace or
augment their plastic mechanisms. (The term “mecha-
nism” is intended to include both behaviors and physical
structures.) For example, learning requires experimenta-
tion, which can be dangerous. There can be advantages to
instinctively avoiding snakes, instead of learning this
behavior by trial-and-error. Similarly, it takes time to build
a callus. There can be advantages to being born with thick-
ened skin on the palms and soles.
3. Plasticity of behavior: Behaviors tend to be more plas-
tic than physical structures. To learn a new behavior, an
organism must make changes to its nervous system. The
nervous system tends to be more flexible and adaptable
than other structures in the body. For example, tanning is
one way to adapt to the sun. Learning provides us with
many other ways to adapt: we may seek shade, wear
clothes, or use sun screen.
4. Plasticity of learning: Learned behaviors tend to be
more plastic than instinctive behaviors. That is, the
learned-instinctive continuum is an instance of the plastic-
rigid continuum. Instincts are part of how we adapt to our
environment, but learning is more flexible than instinct;
learning allows adaptation to a wider range of environ-
ments.
Most of the work in the artificial life and genetic algorithm
communities has focused on the benefits of phenotypic
plasticity and the plasticity of learning (observations 1 and
4) (Ackley and Littman, 1991; Belew, 1989; Belew et al.,
1991; French and Messinger, 1994; Hart, 1994; Hart and
Belew, 1996; Hightower et al., 1996; Whitley and Gruau,
1993; Whitley et al., 1994; Balakrishnan and Honavar,
1995; Belew and Mitchell, 1996). Together, these observa-
tions imply that learning can facilitate evolution.
Some recent work in ALife and GA has combined analysis
of the benefits of phenotypic plasticity, phenotypic rigid-
ity, and the plasticity of learning (observations 1, 2, and 4)
(Anderson, 1995a, 1995b; Cecconi, 1995; Hinton and
Nowlan, 1987; Behera and Nanjundiah, 1995). These
observations imply that learning can facilitate evolution,
but learned behaviors may eventually be replaced by
instinctive behaviors.
Biologists have focused on analysis of the benefits of phe-
notypic plasticity, phenotypic rigidity, and the plasticity of
behavior (observations 1, 2, and 3) (Wcislo, 1989; May-
nard Smith, 1987; Waddington, 1942; Scheiner, 1993;
Simpson, 1953; West-Eberhard, 1989; Gottlieb, 1992).
These observations imply that behaviors can facilitate the
evolution of physical structures.
The biological work (observations 1, 2, 3) makes an inter-
esting contrast to the GA/ALife work (observations 1, 2,
4). Many computer simulations have modelled the distinc-
tion between learning and instinct, but (as far as we know)
no simulations have modelled the distinction between
physical structure and behavior. It is not clear that this dis-
tinction has any meaning in a computer simulation. It
appears to require evolving physical robots.
Our focus in this paper will be on learning versus instinct,
since our primary interest is in evolutionary computation.
Most of what we say here about learning and instinct
applies more generally to phenotypic plasticity and pheno-
typic rigidity, but we will usually leave it to the reader to
make this generalization, since it is not clear that the more
general view is relevant to evolutionary computation.
4 Costs and Benefits of Phenotypic
Plasticity and Rigidity
There is a common, seductive sentiment that learning is
always good; that evolution always selects for more pow-
erful, general-purpose learning engines. In fact, learning is
not always advantageous. Learning is expensive, in many
different ways. Evolution is constantly selecting the best
balance between learning and instinct, and the best bal-
ance varies as behaviors evolve and the environment
changes. There is growing evidence that the human brain
has many more instinctive elements than we usually
acknowledge (Barkow et al., 1992; Pinker, 1994).
Another related myth is that the Baldwin effect is merely a
kind of synergy effect; that the Baldwin effect is the syn-
ergy that results when learning (in individuals) is com-
bined with evolution (in populations). This is only part of
the truth. It is the first observation we listed in the preced-
ing section. In fact, it is false unless it is carefully quali-
fied. Learning can accelerate evolution under certain
circumstances, but it can also slow evolution under other
circumstances.
Baldwin (1896) proposed that learning (phenotypic plas-
ticity) is advantageous when a new behavior is starting to
evolve in a population. Learning smooths the fitness land-
scape, which facilitates evolution (observation 1). If it is
possible for the behavior to be performed by an instinctive
mechanism, it will usually be advantageous for such a
mechanism to evolve, since instinctive mechanisms tend
to be less expensive than learned mechanisms. However,
when a new behavior is first evolving, an instinctive mech-
anism may require the population to make a large evolu-
tionary leap, while a learned mechanism may be able to
arise in smaller evolutionary increments. Learning may
allow the behavior to eventually become common and
robust in the population, which then gives evolution the
time required to find an instinctive mechanism to replace
the learned mechanism. In summary, at first learning is
advantageous, but later it is not.
This picture still requires further qualification. The funda-
mental insight is that there are trade-offs between learning
(plasticity) and instinct (rigidity). The optimal balance
may vary over time, as the population and environment
change. The precise course of this varying balance over
time may not always follow the path that Baldwin (1896)
described. The important lesson from Baldwin (1896) is
not the precise course of the balance; it is that there are
trade-offs. Table 1 is an attempt to list these trade-offs.
1. Time scale of environmental change: Evolution and
learning operate at different time scales (Unemi et al.,
Table 1: Trade-offs in evolution between phenotypic rigidity and
phenotypic plasticity.
dimension of
trade-off
phenotypic rigidity
(e.g., instinct)
phenotypic plasticity
(e.g., learning)
1 time scale of
environmental change
relatively static relatively dynamic
2 variance,
reliability
low variance,
high reliability
high variance,
low reliability
3 energy,
CPU consumption
low energy,
low CPU
high energy,
high CPU
4 length of learning
period
short learning
period
long learning period
5 global versus local
search
more global search more local search
6 adaptability brittle adaptive
7 fitness landscape rugged smooth
8 reinforcement
learning versus
supervised learning
reinforcement
learning
supervised learning
9 bias direction strong bias:
direction of bias
crucial to success
weak bias: direction
of bias not as
important
10 global goals versus
local goals
emphasis on global
goals
emphasis on local
goals
1994; Anderson, 1995a). In a dynamic environment, evo-
lution cannot adapt fast enough, so there is an advantage to
learning (phenotypic plasticity). In a static environment,
evolution can adapt, so there is no penalty for instinct
(phenotypic rigidity), at least in this dimension (the time
scale dimension).
2. Variance and reliability: Learning is based on experi-
ence and requires the right kind of experience. If an indi-
vidual is unfortunate, the right experience will not be
available. This factor makes learning more stochastic or
probabilistic than instinct. If all the other factors are equal,
evolution will eventually replace learning with instinct,
simply because instinct is more reliable (Sober, 1994). On
the positive side, learning can increase the variation in the
population, which can facilitate evolution in some circum-
stances (such as a dynamic environment) (Anderson,
1995a).
3. Energy consumption and CPU consumption: Learn-
ing requires acquisition of data, which involves sensors
and experiments. A living organism or a robot must
expend energy in order to learn. In evolutionary computa-
tion, the CPU is a limited resource. Local search (learning)
requires CPU time, which means that less CPU time is
available for global search (evolution).
4. Length of learning period: An organism (or a robot) is
vulnerable during the period before it has fully learned a
certain behavior. For example, if the behavior is self-
defense, the organism is easier to kill before it has mas-
tered the behavior. If all the other factors are equal, evolu-
tion will select for shorter learning periods (Cecconi et al.,
1995; Anderson, 1995a).
5. Global versus local search: Evolution performs a kind
of global search (Holland’s Schema Theorem) while indi-
vidual learning performs a kind of local search (in the phe-
notype space centered on a given genome). An organism
with strong instincts is putting more emphasis on the glo-
bal search, while an organism with weak instincts is put-
ting more emphasis on the local search. The right trade-off
depends on the fitness landscape and the current location
of the population on that fitness landscape. Thus the right
trade-off varies over the course of the evolution of a given
behavior.
6. Adaptability versus brittleness: Learning is better
able to adjust to variation in the environment. Instinct
tends to be brittle.
7. Fitness landscape: Learning smooths the slope of the
fitness landscape. If the slope is already smooth, learning
may have little advantage over instinct (Hightower et al.,
1996). The relevant smoothness is the smoothness of the
landscape around the current population location, which
varies over the course of the evolution of a given behavior.
8. Reinforcement versus supervised learning: A genetic
algorithm is a type of reinforcement learning algorithm.
Therefore it is situated somewhere between unsupervised
learning and supervised learning, in terms of its use of
feedback from the environment. In a supervised learning
task (e.g., learning to classify from examples), a standard
supervised learner (e.g., backpropagation neural networks
or decision tree induction) has an advantage over a rein-
forcement learner (e.g., a genetic algorithm), because the
supervised learner uses more of the feedback from the
environment. Suppose there are 10 classes and a learner
mistakenly assigns an example to class 3 instead of class 8.
A supervised learner can note that examples of this type
should be assigned to class 8 in the future. A reinforce-
ment learner can only note that examples of this type
should not be assigned to class 3. A hybrid of a genetic
algorithm and a supervised learning algorithm can have an
advantage over a pure genetic algorithm when the environ-
ment provides detailed feedback (Nolfi et al., 1994).
9. Bias direction: Bias is a familiar concept in machine
learning: every inductive learner requires a bias in order to
select one hypothesis from the infinite set of hypotheses
that are consistent with a given set of observations (Haus-
sler, 1988; Rendell, 1986; Utgoff, 1986). For example, a
preference for simpler hypotheses is a form of bias. Bias
has direction (correctness) and strength (Utgoff, 1986).
There is a strong analogy between the learned-instinctive
continuum and the strong-weak bias continuum. A
strongly biased machine learning system is like an organ-
ism that emphasizes instinctive behaviors. A weakly
biased machine learning system is like an organism that
emphasizes learned behaviors. If the bias direction is cor-
rect (for example, if simpler hypotheses are more likely to
be true than complex hypotheses), strong bias (instinct) is
best, since a strong and correct bias accelerates learning
(Utgoff, 1986). If the bias direction is incorrect (for exam-
ple, there is no correlation between the complexity of
hypotheses and the truth of hypotheses), weak bias (learn-
ing) is best, since a weak bias can be corrected with fewer
data than a strong bias.
10. Global goals versus local goals: Evolution and learn-
ing have different goals. Evolution seeks to maximize fit-
ness, but individuals have more immediate goals, such as
to eat food that tastes good. Learning is used by individu-
als to help them achieve their immediate goals, which may
not match with the goals of evolution (Nolfi et al., 1994;
Menczer & Belew, 1994; Turney, 1995). In biological evo-
lution, no organism can have “maximize expected inclu-
sive fitness” as a goal, because it is too difficult to
determine whether a given action will contribute to this
goal. Instead, biological organisms must substitute simpler
goals, such as “seek sweet, fatty food”. Whether these
simpler goals will serve as reasonable substitutes for the
goal of fitness is contingent on the environment. In evolu-
tionary computation, evolution and learning can have
identical goals. However, as the complexity of problems
tackled by evolutionary computation increases, we may
expect it to become more similar to biological evolution in
this respect. For example, in machine learning, the prob-
lem of learning to classify accurately is simpler than the
problem of learning to classify with low cost. One
approach to classifying with low cost is to evolve a popu-
lation of learners, where each individual has the goal of
learning to classify accurately, but the fitness of the indi-
viduals is determined by the cost of classification (Turney,
1995).
The above list is not necessarily exhaustive and there may
be some overlap in the items. The more we contemplate
the Baldwin effect, the longer the list grows.
5 Lamarckism and the Baldwin Effect
In this section, we examine a cluster of myths and legends
involving the relationship between Lamarckism and the
Baldwin effect.
5.1 The Baldwin Effect is Purely Darwinian
Lamarck believed in the inheritance of acquired character-
istics. In biology and in more complex evolutionary com-
putation, there is a distinction between the genotype and
the phenotype. Lamarckism requires an inverse mapping
from phenotype and environment to genotype. This
inverse mapping is biologically implausible. However, the
Baldwin effect is purely Darwinian; not Lamarckian. The
Baldwin effect does not involve any inverse mapping.
Suppose a short-necked animal learns to stretch its neck to
reach nutritious leaves on a tall tree. Lamarck believed
that the animal’s offspring would inherit slightly longer
necks than they would otherwise have had. This would
require a mechanism for modifying the DNA of the parent,
to alter its genes for neck length, based on its habit of
stretching its neck.
The Baldwin effect has consequences that are similar to
Lamarckian evolution. Over many generations, animals
that stretch their necks may evolve longer necks. How-
ever, the mechanism is purely Darwinian. Parents who
stretch their necks will pass on to their children not their
longer necks, but rather their ability to stretch their necks.
Evolution will select for the ability to stretch. Over many
generations, the population will evolve to consist largely
of animals that are very good at stretching their necks.
However, there can be advantages to being born with a
longer neck. Given sufficient time, the population may
eventually evolve longer necks. Their ability to stretch
their necks is what grants them the time required to evolve
longer necks. The point of this story is that the Baldwin
effect is somewhat Lamarckian in its results, but it is not
Lamarckian in its mechanisms.
5.2 Lamarckism is Computationally Intractable in
General
It might be argued that, although Lamarckism is not bio-
logically accurate, it is ideal for evolutionary computation.
Living organisms do not modify their DNA, based on their
experience, but we can simulate Lamarckian evolution in a
computer. Perhaps Lamarckian evolution is superior to the
Baldwin effect, when we are attempting to solve problems
by evolutionary computation (Belew, 1990; Hightower et
al., 1996; Whitley et al., 1994; Moscato, 1989, 1993; Mos-
cato and Fontanari, 1990; Norman and Moscato, 1989;
Moscato and Norman, 1992; Radcliffe and Surry, 1994;
Paechter et al., 1995; Burke et al., 1995).
Lamarckian evolution requires an inverse mapping from
phenotype and environment to genotype. This inverse
mapping may be computable in many simple applications
of evolutionary computation. However, we believe that the
computation will typically be intractable, for interesting,
real-world problem solving. For example, we applied the
Baldwin effect to the problem of learning to classify with
low cost (Turney, 1995). The genotype was a string of bits,
specifying a bias for a decision tree induction system. The
phenotype was a decision tree. The environment was the
data. The mapping from genotype (bias) and environment
(data) to phenotype (decision tree) was easily computed,
but there is no known algorithm for the inverse mapping
from phenotype (decision tree) and environment (data) to
genotype (bias). As our applications for evolutionary com-
putation grow increasingly complex, Lamarckian evolu-
tion will become decreasingly feasible.
In some recent work with Lamarckian evolution, there is
no distinction between the phenotype and the genotype
(Whitley et al., 1994; Paechter et al., 1995; Burke et al.,
1995). This produces the misleading impression that the
inverse mapping is trivial. It may well be trivial for many
interesting and worthwhile problems, but we believe that it
is generally intractable. With progress in evolutionary
computing, we will eventually encounter the limits of the
Lamarckian approach.
It has also been pointed out that Lamarckian evolution dis-
torts the population so that the Schema Theorem no longer
applies (Whitley et al., 1994). The Baldwin effect alters
the fitness landscape, but it does not modify the basic evo-
lutionary mechanism (i.e., it is purely Darwinian). There-
fore the Schema Theorem still applies to the Baldwin
effect.
5.3 Memes are Not Necessarily Lamarckian
We would like to discuss one more myth concerning
Lamarckian evolution and the Baldwin effect. Dawkins
(1976) proposed that ideas evolve in culture in much the
same sense as organisms evolve in biology, and he coined
the term meme for the basic unit of cultural transmission,
analogous to the gene in biological evolution. Dawkins
(1982) and Gould (1991) have suggested that memes
evolve by Lamarckian mechanisms. Several authors have
used the term memetic evolution as essentially synony-
mous with Lamarckian evolution (Moscato, 1989, 1993;
Moscato and Fontanari, 1990; Norman and Moscato,
1989; Moscato and Norman, 1992; Radcliffe and Surry,
1994; Paechter et al., 1995; Burke et al., 1995). Cziko
(1995) argues to the contrary that meme evolution is
purely Darwinian. We agree with Cziko (1995).
Let us examine some of the arguments for Lamarckian
evolution of memes. To begin, we need to define the geno-
type-phenotype distinction for memes, since both
Lamarckian evolution and the Baldwin effect require this
distinction. The devices by which we express our ideas are
analogous to genotypes; the ideas themselves are analo-
gous to phenotypes. Since memes are defined as analogous
to genes (Dawkins, 1976), we will use the term meme to
refer to the devices by which we express our ideas. Exam-
ples of memes are spoken sentences, written sentences,
live music, recorded music, theatre, and cinema. We will
use the term idea to refer to the ideas themselves.
When a human brain receives a meme (i.e., is colonized by
a meme), the meme slowly (over seconds or days) matures
into an idea. Eventually the human may decide to commu-
nicate the idea to another person. Communication involves
transmitting a meme. If memes use Lamarckian evolution,
then there is a kind of reverse engineering in the host
brain, by which the mature idea is transformed into a
meme that captures the content of the mature idea. If
memes use Darwinian evolution, then the meme that is
transmitted is the result of mutation and crossover with
other memes in the host brain. Introspection suggests that
Lamarckian evolution is more accurate: memes appear to
be a kind of encoding of mature ideas. However, intro-
spection is notoriously unreliable. We will consider two
other arguments for Lamarckian evolution of memes.
One argument for Lamarckian memes is based on compar-
ing what people hear to what people say. The meme that is
received by a brain is generally quite different from the
meme that is later transmitted. We are not merely record-
ing machines that can only play back what we have heard.
However, this does not imply that memes are non-Darwin-
ian. Suppose that a human brain colonized by memes is
analogous to an island colonized by birds. The memes that
shuttle back and forth from brain to brain are analogous to
those birds that dare to leave their island of birth and fly to
another island. If we see one type of bird fly to an island
and then ten-thousand years later see a quite different type
of bird leave the island, we would be wrong to infer that
we had witnessed a case of Lamarckian evolution. It seems
possible that memes in our brains may evolve as much in a
few minutes or days as birds evolve in ten-thousand years.
A second argument for Lamarckian memes is based on
creativity. Creative thought often seems to consist of com-
bining ideas to make new ideas. This might appear to sup-
port a Lamarckian view. However, perhaps creative
thought is a mating of memes, rather than a merging of
ideas. Unlike biological organisms, memes do not seem to
respect species boundaries; any two memes might mate
with each other and produce fertile offspring. The evi-
dence appears to be compatible with both Lamarck and
Darwin.
We do not have proof that memes are Darwinian, nor that
they are not Lamarckian. Our argument is that it is possi-
ble that memes are not Lamarckian. Therefore it is prema-
ture to use memetic evolution as a synonym for
Lamarckian evolution.
5.4 Memes May Be Baldwinian
We believe that memes may evolve by exploiting the Bald-
win effect. In support of this claim, we will argue that
memes satisfy all of the necessary conditions for the mani-
festation of the Baldwin effect.
The Baldwin effect requires Darwinian evolution, which
requires entities that reproduce, with heritable traits and
some degree of variation, and selection, which typically
arises from competition for limited resources. Dawkins
(1976) has already argued persuasively that memes satisfy
the requirements for Darwinian evolution. In addition, the
Baldwin effect requires phenotypic plasticity. The popula-
tion must display heritable variation in phenotypic plastic-
ity, and plasticity must have costs and benefits, in terms of
the mechanism of selection.
Ideas (the phenotypes of memes) clearly have varying
degrees of plasticity. That is, some ideas are more flexible
and adaptable than others. The environment to which ideas
must adapt consists mainly of the other ideas that inhabit
the host brain. The mechanism of selection is familiar,
although poorly understood: we choose to entertain some
ideas and ignore other ideas. In general, we choose plastic
ideas; ideas that get along well with the other ideas we
accept; ideas that fit into the ecology of the host brain. But
plastic ideas also have costs. For an idea to adapt as a phe-
notype, during its lifetime in a particular host brain, the
host brain must process the idea; the idea must consume
brain time; the human host has to think hard. Therefore
plasticity in ideas has both costs and benefits.
It appears that memes satisfy all of the requirements for
manifestation of the Baldwin effect. We previously argued
(Section 5.3) that memes are not necessarily Lamarckian.
We believe that memes are more likely to be Baldwinian
than Lamarckian. Our arguments do not prove this, but
they at least show that Baldwinian memes are at least as
plausible as Lamarckian memes.
Baldwinian and Lamarckian evolution are virtually indis-
tinguishable in their effect. We believe that no “external”
(e.g., linguistic) analysis of memes will be able to resolve
the Baldwin/Lamarck meme dispute. It seems to us that
only an “internal” (e.g., neurological) analysis can settle
the arguments, just as Lamarck could only be properly
rejected for biological evolution when the distinction
between somatic and germ cells was discovered by the
embryologist August Weismann.
6 Conclusion
We have argued that the Baldwin effect is widely misun-
derstood. There seem to be two general categories of mis-
understandings. We discussed the first category in
Section 4: many researchers have focused on the benefits
of lifetime learning in an evolving population, but there
are also costs. We listed some of the costs and benefits, but
our list may be far from complete. The Baldwin effect has
depths that we have not yet plumbed.
Section 5 examined the second category of myths and leg-
ends: those involving the relationship between Lamarck-
ian evolution and the Baldwin effect. We argued three
points: (1) The Baldwin effect is not Lamarckian. It is
purely Darwinian. (2) There are reasons to believe that the
Baldwin effect has more applications in evolutionary com-
putation than Lamarckian evolution. Lamarckian evolu-
tion requires an inverse mapping from phenotype and
environment to genotype. We believe that computing this
mapping is intractable in general. (3) Contrary to popular
opinion, it is not clear that memes use Lamarckian evolu-
tion. It is equally plausible that they use the Baldwin
effect.
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